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1. Introduction 
Since becoming commercially available in 1996, genetically modified (GM) crops have been 
both successful and controversial. In 2013, more that 175 million hectares of GM crops 
were grown worldwide (James, 2013). Production is, however, geographically concentrated 
into five main countries (United States, Argentina, Brazil, India and Canada), which together 
accounted for nearly 90% of the area planted to GM crops in 2013. Remarkably, for a large 
agricultural producing region, the European Union (EU) has been on the sidelines. In 2013, 
when the United States planted 70.1 million hectares to GM crops, for example, the EU only 
grew about 0.1 million hectares (all of it maize, and most of which was grown in one 
country, Spain). This state of affairs reflects the contentious reception of agricultural 
biotechnology by some segments of the public, and the related stringent regulation for GM 
crops. Indeed, the EU arguably has the most comprehensive and restrictive GM product 
regulation in the world.  
The terms of the EU regulation of GM products includes three main pillars. First, a 
premarket authorization that hinges on a single risk assessment process by the European 
Food Safety Authority, and a multi-level risk management stage that involves both the 
Commission and the member states. Next, post-market obligations include two distinct sets 
of measures: comprehensive mandatory GM product labeling and traceability requirements, 
which became operative in April 2004; and, a set of “coexistence measures” as articulated in 
the July 2010 Recommendation 2010/C 200/01 “on guidelines for the development of 
national co-existence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional 
and organic crops” (European Commission, 2010). This recommendation repealed and 
replaced the earlier July 2003 Recommendation 2003/556/EC that first set out guidelines 
for strategies and best practices for coexistence. 
The stated intention of coexistence measures is to address economic and marketing 
implications, not safety issues (which are assumed to have been dealt with satisfactorily at the 
pre-market GM approval stage). The main concern being addressed is adventitious 
contamination at the farm level as may arise from using impure seed lots, cross-pollination, 
and/or sharing of harvesting machinery. Thus, what coexistence rules are trying to address is 
a type of externality that GM growers may impose on non-GM farmers. Because this EU 
regulation is being handled through the principle of subsidiarity, specific measures are being 
worked out at the national level. Coexistence measures being contemplated include spatial 
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isolation, such as mandatory isolation distances between GM and non-GM plots and/or the 
use of buffer zones, and time isolation (Czarnak-Klos and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2010). Such 
requirements are non-trivial. For example, isolation distances being consider by EU states 
for maize range from 15 to 800 meters, with a median of 200 meters (Devos et al., 2014).1 
A key principle articulated in Recommendation 2003/556/EC was that farmers 
“who introduce the new production type should bear the responsibility of implementing the 
farm management measures necessary to limit gene flow” (European Commission, 2003). 
This clearly entailed a strong assignment of property rights, suggesting the implementation 
of procedures based on the often-invoked polluter-pays principle.  The currently active 
Recommendation 2010/C 200/01 moved away from such an explicit assignment of property 
rights, providing flexibility to member states to tailor coexistence measures to their specific 
needs.2 This observation motivates the analysis of this paper. Given that coexistence 
measures are implemented to avoid unintended GM presence in conventional and organic 
production, does it matter whose burden it is to implement such measures?  
To address this question, we develop a simple but explicit spatial equilibrium model 
that captures some of the essential aspects of the coexistence problem. Our approach is 
novel relative to the existing literature in a few key dimensions. Beckmann, Soregaroli and 
Wesseler (2006, 2011) focused on the tradeoff between ex ante regulations (such as isolation 
distances and buffer zones) and ex post liability rules (defining compensation for possible 
economic damage suffered by non-GM producers). Demont et al. (2008; 2009) and Ceddia 
et al. (2011) compared the effects of alternative coexistence measures in an explicit spatial 
context using simulation methods. As noted by Desquilbet and Poret (2013), a limitation of 
all such contributions is that the prices of GM and non-GM products are taken as 
                                                     
1 Concerns about coexistence are not unique to the EU, see, for example, Furtan, Güzel and 
Weseen (2007), and Green and Smith (2010). In the United States, in 2011 the US Secretary 
of Agriculture reactivated the Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century 
Agriculture (AC21) and charged it to focus on issues related to the coexistence of biotech, 
organic and conventional crops. The ensuing report (AC21, 2012) addressed potential 
compensation mechanisms to deal with losses to farmers due to unintended presence of GM 
material, although it did not come to a consensus on that matter. 
 
2 But the new Recommendation 2010/C 200/01 opens the door for even more stringent 
coexistence measures by noting that the potential loss of income for conventional and 
organic producers may arise even if the adventitious presence of GM material does not reach 
the 0.9 threshold that triggers mandatory GM labeling.   
 3 
exogenous (i.e., they are not equilibrium analyses). Desquilbet and Poret (2014) developed an 
equilibrium model of coexistence within a vertical product differentiation model, and use it 
to study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability on market outcomes and welfare. 
Their equilibrium model, however, is non-spatial in nature. The equilibrium model we 
develop in this paper, by contrast, captures the essential spatial nature of coexistence 
measures such as isolation distances and buffer zones. This approach also permits us to 
emphasize the fact that the externality effect noted by previous coexistence studies is best 
viewed as a nonconvexity, with specific implications for equilibrium and welfare.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the details of the demand side, 
which presumes that consumers weakly prefer non-GM product to GM-product in a vertical 
product differentiation structure, and of the supply side, where coexistence measures are 
implemented by GM producers. Section 3 characterizes competitive equilibria. Section 4 
exploits the equilibrium nature of the model to derive the welfare implications of the 
analysis. Section 5 discusses possible effects of farmers’ negotiations on the competitive 
equilibrium. The paper concludes with further discussion of the model and its policy 
implications. 
 
2. The Model 
A byproduct of the introduction and adoption of GM crops has been an induced product 
differentiation effect (Moschini, 2008). Insofar as some consumers are averse to GM 
products and they are willing to pay a premium to avoid them, the post-innovation market is 
best viewed as one with vertical product differentiation (VPD) preferences. To supply all 
segments of the market, a costly system of segregation and identity preservation is required 
(Desquilbet and Bullock, 2009), a process that encompasses the coexistence measures 
analyzed in this paper. In the model that we develop, therefore, we postulate a VPD demand 
structure. On the supply side we assume profit maximizing agents that choose between 
conventional production and a more efficient GM technology. Because our focus is on 
coexistence measures at the farm level (isolation distances and/or buffer zones), we abstract 
from other measures required to maintain identity preservation throughout the processing 
and distribution system. The model we propose is also simplified in other respects. Unlike 
other contributions in the field (Beckmann, Soregaroli and Wesseler, 2006; Desquilbet and 
Poret, 2014), we do not model explicitly liability provisions. In some sense, however, such 
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rules are implicit in our model: we do assume that farmers comply with the mandated 
coexistence measures, which in turn presumes the existence of an effective enforcement 
system (and liability rules could clearly serve that purpose). 
 
2.1. Demand: Vertical product differentiation  
As noted, the presumption is that consumers view otherwise-identical GM and non-GM 
products within the VPD preference structure. Specifically, we employ the simple unit-
demand parameterization of the VPD model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), whereby each 
consumer buys at most one unit of the good in question and her preferences are described 
by the (indirect) utility function U q pθ= −  (if the good is bought, 0U =  otherwise), where 
q ++∈   indexes the quality of the good, ++∈p  is the price of the good, and the 
preference parameter θ θ θ + ∈ ⊆  ,  indexes consumer types.  The hypothesis here is that 
of heterogeneous preferences for quality so that the population of consumers can be 
characterized by the distribution function θ( )G  of the preference parameter. 
More specifically, in our context there are only two possible qualities in this market, a 
“low” quality gq  (the GM product) and a “high” quality >n gq q  (the non-GM product).  If 
these two qualities are available at prices gp  and np , respectively, where > > 0n gp p , then 
the consumer decision problem is to select the choice that yields the highest utility among 
the three possible options: 
(1) 
if the non-GM product is bought
if the GM product is bought
otherwise0
n n
g g
q p
U q p
θ
θ
 −
= −


 
We further postulate that the distribution θ( )G  is uniform and that θ ∈[0,1] .  The latter 
condition, in particular, implies that the market will be “uncovered” (i.e., as long as prices are 
strictly positive, some consumers with a low enough θ  will not buy anything).   
To derive the demand functions implied by these preferences, define the threshold 
levels ˆ ( ) ( )n g n gp p q qθ ≡ − −  and 0 g gp qθ ≡ . Throughout, we will consider the typical case 
where 0 ˆ0 1θ θ< ≤ ≤ , such that consumers with θ θ∈ ˆ[ ,1]  will buy the non-GM product, 
consumers with 0 ˆ[ , ]θ θ θ∈  will buy the GM product, and consumers with 0[0, ]θ θ∈  will 
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buy nothing. For the population of M  consumers, market demands are readily obtained by 
integrating the unit demand of each consumer given the distribution of consumer types. For 
the uniform distribution invoked earlier, the aggregate market demand functions are  
(2) 
 −
= −  − 
1 n gDn
n g
p p
X M
q q
 
(3) 
 −
= −  − 
n g gD
g
n g g
p p p
X M
q q q
. 
In what follows it is convenient to work with the inverse demand functions.  To 
simplify notation somewhat, define ≡gq q  and ≡ +nq q a , so that = − > 0n ga q q  is the 
“additional” quality provided by the non-GM product for the highest-value consumer. 
Inverting (2) and (3), for given quantities [ ]∈ 0,iX M , { },i g n∈ , satisfying + ≤g nX X M , 
yields 
(4) 
+ 
= − 
 
1 g ng
X X
p q
M
 
(5) 
( )( )
( ) g nn
qX q a X
p q a
M
+ +
= + −  
Equations (4) and (5) display the market’s marginal willingness to pay for the two goods, for 
given supply levels, but also implicitly defines the marginal willingness to pay for the 
additional quality associated with the non-GM product, which is parameterized by a .  It 
follows that the (inverse) derived demand for the additional quality is 
(6)  − = − 
 
1 nn g
Xp p a
M
. 
Note that this (market) marginal willingness to pay for the additional quality depends only on 
the quantity supplied of the high-quality good (because this quantity implicitly defines the 
marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing the non-GM or GM good).  
 
2.2. Coexistence measures and supply 
We suppose a large number N  of farms, and for simplicity we assume that they are identical, 
with size normalized to one, and that they each have the same expected output y . To 
motivate the potential adoption of GM crops, given that they are considered weakly inferior 
on the demand side, we need to postulate some efficiency advantage. GM crops with 
 6 
herbicide tolerance traits provide cost savings relative to conventional crops, whereas GM 
crops with insect resistant traits, in addition to cost savings, are believed to also have a yield-
enhancing effect (Xu et al., 2013). For the purpose of this paper, however, the higher 
efficiency of GM crops is modeled simply as a cost-saving effect. This approach permits a 
cleaner analytical solution because, given that total land is given, it keeps total output fixed. 
Consequently, we can focus on how coexistence measures affect the allocation of land 
between GM and non-GM crops without having to deal with the possible aggregate output 
change from GM crop adoption that would arise if the efficiency gain of GM crops were 
modeled as a yield-enhancing effect. Specifically, the total cost for a full non-GM farm is 
assumed to be cy , with the per-unit cost satisfying 0c > , whereas for a full GM farm the 
total cost is γ−(1 )cy , where γ ∈(0,1)  is the cost-saving coefficient.  
As done by virtually all previous work on coexistence, we assume initially that 
coexistence regulations put the burden of implementing coexistence requirements on GM 
farms. The stated objective of these regulations is to prevent the externality effect they might 
have on non-GM farms. Specifically, we model this burden by requiring that a GM farm 
bordering a non-GM farm must establish a buffer zone. This portion of land is assumed to 
be planted with non-GM crop, but its output is to be marketed as GM product. Hence, the 
non-GM crop to be sold as such is effectively isolated from the GM crop by the buffer zone 
which, by assumption, is of sufficient size to prevent unintended contamination of the non-
GM product (e.g., via pollen flow). This modeling approach represents in a straightforward 
fashion the “cost” of coexistence measures: a GM farmer who must implement buffer zones 
obtains the GM cost saving only on a fraction of its land.  
To give the model a spatial nature and retain analytical tractability, we think of farms 
as having dimension along a line, so that a GM farm can border a non-GM farm at either 
end, as illustrated in Figure 1. The size of the buffer zone required at the boundary between 
GM and non-GM areas is a fraction, 0β > , of the farm size. We assume β < 1 2 , so that 
effective isolation of GM and non-GM production is, in principle, feasible by the action of a 
single farm. Furthermore, to avoid end-point asymmetries we assume that these farms are 
distributed along a circle. 
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Figure 1. Farms along a line and isolating buffer zones 
 
 
 
As noted, the buffer zone is planted with the non-GM crop but its output is treated 
as GM output (because it is itself not isolated from the own-farm GM output). Thus, the 
cost saving of the new technology for a GM farm bordering a non-GM farm is reduced. If it 
borders a non-GM farm on one side only, as in the lower panel of Figure 1, the total cost of 
this GM farm is γ β β− − +(1 )(1 )cy cy . If the GM farm borders non-GM farms on both 
sides, as in the upper panel of Figure 1, its total cost is γ β β− − +(1 )(1 2 ) 2cy cy . Therefore, 
for given output prices np  and gp  of the non-GM and GM products, respectively, the 
profits of the possible types of farms are as follows: 
(7) π = −0n np y cy  
(8) π γ= − −0 (1 )
g
gp y cy  
(9) π β γ β= − − − −1 (1 )(1 )
g
gp y cy cy  
(10) π β γ β= − − − −2 (1 2 )(1 ) 2
g
gp y cy cy  
where the superscript { , }i n g∈  denotes the type of farm (non-GM and GM, respectively), 
and the subscript ∈{0,1,2}j  refers to the number of buffer zones that the particular farm is 
implementing. 
 
3. Equilibria 
A competitive equilibrium in our setting consists of a pair of equilibrium prices >* 0np  and 
>* 0gp , and an allocation with ≥
* 0gN  GM farms and ≥
* 0nN  non-GM farms. These 
non-GM farm non-GM farm GM farm 
β β
non-GM farm GM farm GM farm 
β
…..
…..
…..
…..
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equilibrium values must satisfy three sets of conditions: (i) the markets for GM and non-GM 
products clear (no excess demand for either product); (ii) no farm has a unilateral incentive 
to change production type; and, (iii) farmers make non-negative profit. The supply side that 
we have outlined is constrained by land availability, such that + ≤* *n gN N N  must hold, and 
by strictly positive per-unit production costs. In equilibrium either of these two types of 
constraints could be binding. In what follows we intend to consider equilibria in which all 
land is used in production, both before and after the GM innovation. The required 
restriction on the parameter space can rely on the threshold parameter 0θ  introduced earlier, 
which identifies the consumer type who is indifferent between consuming one unit of the 
good or staying out of the market. When land is fully utilized, this parameter 0 (0,1)θ ∈  
satisfies 
(11) 0 1
Ny
M
θ
 
= − 
 
  
Hence, the threshold parameter 0θ  represents the fraction of the potential market M  that is 
not served at full production.3 To ensure that all the land is used in the pre-innovation 
equilibrium and in post-innovation equilibria, it suffices to require: 
 
Assumption 1.  The parameters of the model satisfy 0c qθ≤ . 
 
This assumption guarantees that all farmers make non-negative profit in all the equilibria that 
we analyze, and thus the equilibrium condition (iii) noted above will not be considered 
explicitly again in what follows. 
In the post-innovation situation, depending on the parameters of the model, many 
types of equilibria are possible: coexistence equilibria in which both crops are grown, and 
specialized equilibria in which only one crop is grown (either the GM or the non-GM 
product). The critical determinants of equilibrium are: the size of the efficiency gain of GM 
                                                     
3 We note that this parameter can also be related to the (local) elasticity of total demand 
n gX X X≡ + , where from (2) and (3) it follows that ( )1 gX M p q= − . When the (absolute 
value of the) demand elasticity ε ≡ − ∂ ∂( )( )g gX p p X  is evaluated at the price configuration 
of full production (i.e., when =X Ny ), it is then verified that 0 (1 )θ ε ε= + . 
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production, parameterized by γ ; the size of consumers’ additional willingness to pay for the 
non-GM product, vis-à-vis the GM product, parameterized by a ; and, the cost of separating 
GM and non-GM production, parameterized by β .  Because we are particularly interested 
in the conditions under which coexistence of both GM and non-GM farms attains in 
equilibrium, we analyze this case first. To steer clear of cumbersome analytics, throughout 
we treat the number gN  of GM farms and the number nN  of non-GM farms as real 
numbers, rather than integers (as long as the total number of farms N  is reasonably large, 
there is little loss of generality with this approach). 
 
3.1. Coexistence equilibria  
For an equilibrium with coexistence of both GM and non-GM production, the allocation 
with >* 0gN  GM farms and >* 0nN  non-GM farms must clear the markets. Given 
Assumption 1, total output is predetermined: * * * *n g n gX X N y N y Ny+ = + = . Hence, from (4) 
and (11), the equilibrium price of the GM product is  
(12) * 0gp qθ=  
The equilibrium price for the non-GM product, on the other hand, will depend on the 
amount of non-GM product grown in equilibrium. Specifically, from (6) it will satisfy 
(13) 
*
* * 1 nn g
N y
p p a
M
 
= + − 
 
 
 
To pin down the equilibrium price for the non-GM product, we need to solve for 
*
nN , which depends on cost parameters and on the spatial configuration of production that 
arises in equilibrium. Given the spatial equilibrium requirement that, at given prices, farms of 
different type (GM and non-GM) have no incentive to change the crop they grow, for all 
spatial equilibria with coexistence the following property applies. 
 
Lemma 1. In a coexistence spatial equilibrium, there can be no isolated GM farms. 
 
By “isolated GM farm” we mean a farm that is bordered by non-GM farms on both sides, as 
illustrated in the top portion of Figure 1. Lemma 1 follows immediately by noting that, for 
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such a configuration to be an equilibrium, one would need 2 0
g nπ π=  (at given prices). But 
this is not possible in equilibrium because the non-GM farm at this boundary would find it 
profitable to switch to GM production—this would result in the switching farm having, at 
most, only one buffer zone, and by assumption 1 2
g gπ π> .   
Having ruled out coexistence equilibria with isolated GM farms, the relevant 
equilibrium condition is that, at the equilibrium prices, π π= 01
g n . Using the definitions in 
equations (7) and (9), this condition requires 
(14) * *(1 ) n gc p pγ β− = −  
which, recalling (12), implies 
(15) * 0 (1 )np q cθ γ β= + − . 
It is useful to note that *gp , which reflects the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer 
identified by θ0 , is constant in this model (because of the assumption that all land is in 
production). However, this price does depend on the quality q  of the GM product—as this 
quality attribute decreases, strictly positive GM production can be supported in equilibrium 
only by lower GM prices.  The non-GM price *np , on the other hand, is increasing in the 
efficiency gain parameter γ  and decreasing in the coexistence burden parameter β . These 
properties reflect the supply-side competition brought about by the introduction of a more 
efficient production technique: the non-GM price reflects the willingness to pay of the 
marginal consumer θˆ  who is indifferent between the two goods, which increases as GM 
production displaces non-GM production.  
The equilibrium price relation (14) can be used to solve (13) for the equilibrium 
number of non-GM farms 
(16) *
0
1 (1 )
(1 )n
c NN
a
γ
β
θ
 
= − −  − 
 . 
Given the constraint = −* *g nN N N , the equilibrium number of GM farms is then 
(17) * 0
0
(1 )
(1 )g
c NN
a
γ
β θ
θ
 
= − −  − 
 . 
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As expected, the equilibrium number of non-GM farms is inversely related to 
improved efficiency of the GM crop (as captured by the cost saving factor cγ ) and directly 
related to the parameter a  that quantifies the intensity of preference of consumers for the 
non-GM product. In fact, the results of this paper are best expressed in terms of the ratio of 
these two terms, c aγ . It is also apparent that the equilibrium number of non-GM farms is 
directly related to parameter β  indexing the costliness of the buffer zone requirements. 
Specifically, from (16) and (17), it follows that to have a coexistence equilibrium with both 
* 0nN >  and 
* 0gN >  it is necessary that 
(18) 0 1
1 (1 )
c
a
θ γ
β β
< <
− −
. 
 Whereas the foregoing characterizes a competitive spatial equilibrium 
* * * *( , , , )n g n gp p N N , the fact remains that a number of spatial configurations of GM and non-
GM farms might be consistent with this equilibrium. One such configuration, of course, is 
the most efficient spatial allocation that results in full agglomeration of GM and non-GM 
production (such that only two buffer strips are required, in total, to separate the set of 
farms that produce GM product from the set of farms that produce non-GM product). 
Even such an efficient equilibrium is not unique in the sense that the identity of the farms 
belonging to either set (GM or non-GM) is not determined. This has some relevance 
because, in the foregoing competitive equilibrium, firms belonging to the interior of the GM 
set make a strictly higher profit than all other firms. In any event, equilibria with partial 
agglomeration are also possible.  
Figure 2 depicts two possible spatial equilibrium configurations with four GM farms 
and four non-GM farms. The situation on the left panel of this figure corresponds to case of 
full spatial agglomeration: The set of farms { }1,2,7,8  produce the GM product and the set 
of farms { }3, 4,5,6,  produce the non-GM product. The right panel of this figure illustrates 
an instance of partial agglomeration: The set of farms producing the GM product is 
{ }1,2,5,6 and the set of farms producing the non-GM product is { }3, 4,7,8 . Note that 
because these two configurations entail exactly the same number of GM and non-GM farms, 
both equilibrium configurations are supported by the same equilibrium prices. Clearly the 
configuration in the right panel of Figure 2 is less efficient, as it entails higher buffer zone 
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costs (the return to producers’ fixed resource, land, is thus lowered). 
 
Figure 2. Two possible spatial configurations of farms in competitive equilibrium 
 
 
3.2. Specialized equilibria 
Coexistence between GM and non-GM products is clearly not the only possible competitive 
equilibrium outcome in this model, as specialized equilibria may also emerge. Consider first 
the possibility that only the GM good is produced in equilibrium, such that =gX Ny  and  
= 0nX . In this equilibrium the prices of the two products are * 0gp qθ=  and 
* *
n gp p a= + . For 
=*gN N  and  =* 0nN  to be an equilibrium it must be that, at these prices, π π≤0 0
gn , which 
requires 1c aγ ≥ .  Hence, if the marginal willingness to pay for non-GM product of the 
highest valuation consumer is less than the cost saving that GM products yields (i.e., a cγ≤ ), 
non-GM production is not attractive and all farms growing GM products constitute an 
equilibrium. 
Comparing the parametric domain for the foregoing specialized equilibrium with the 
prior results concerning coexistence equilibria, we find that there is a range 
( )1,1 (1 )c aγ β∈ −  where a specialized equilibrium with only GM products, and a 
coexistence equilibrium with both products, are both possible. This is because, starting from 
a situation in which all farms are of the GM type, the condition required for any one farm to 
strictly prefer to switch to non-GM status is π π>0 0
gn . On the other hand, starting from a 
coexistence equilibrium, a competitive non-GM farm that borders a GM farm would find it 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
GM farms 
Non-GM farms 
ββ
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
β
β
GM 
farms 
GM 
farms 
Non-GM 
farms 
Non-GM 
farms 
β
β
1
2
3
45
6
8
7
1
2
3
45
6
8
7
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strictly profitable to switch status only if π π> 01
g n , and naturally π π>0 1
g g .4 
 Next, consider the case when only the non-GM good is produced. For =*nN N  to 
be an equilibrium, implying = 0gX  and  =nX Ny , it must be that at the corresponding 
prices * 0gp qθ=  and 
*
0( )np q a θ= +  it is not profitable for a single farm to switch to GM 
production, that is, π π≤ 02
g n . From the profits in (7) and (10), this requires 
0 (1 2 )c aγ θ β≤ − .  
Again, we have a parametric range in which both a coexistence equilibrium, and a 
specialized equilibrium with only non-GM farms, are possible. Specifically, this arises when 
( )0 0(1 ) , (1 2 )c aγ θ β θ β∈ − − . The reasons are similar to those given for the other 
specialized equilibrium. Starting from a specialized equilibrium with only non-GM farms, any 
one competitive farm will find it profitable to switch to GM status if π π> 02
g n . On the other 
hand, from a coexistence equilibrium, a GM farm bordering a non-GM farm will find it 
strictly profitable to switch if π π>0 1
gn , and naturally π π>1 2
g g . The parametric domain 
( )0 (1 2 ) , 1c aγ θ β∈ −  defines what may be called the “robust coexistence” set, where 
specialized equilibria are ruled out and only coexistence with both GM and non-GM 
products can arise in equilibrium. Quite clearly, the robust coexistence set can be empty, 
which arises when the buffer zone requirement is sufficiently large (i.e., when 0(1 ) 2β θ≥ − ). 
 
4. Welfare 
To assess the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium, we need to compare it with the 
optimal allocation of land from the perspective of social welfare. Before proceeding to do 
that, however, it bears to note a particular feature of the model at hand which, while 
somewhat special to the parameterization chosen, nonetheless provides critical insights into 
the peculiar nature of GM technology innovation: the introduction of a weakly inferior good 
(Lapan and Moschini, 2004).  
 
 
                                                     
4  A non-GM farm that does not border any GM farm would find it strictly profitable to 
switch status only if the stricter condition π π> 02
g n  held.  
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4.1. Consumer surplus decline 
Because we are modeling the innovation as cost reducing, and total land is taken as given 
and fully utilized in both the pre-innovation and post-innovation equilibria, aggregate supply 
is perfectly inelastic. Given this feature, the standard VPD demand structure that we are 
using implies that, as long as we are in a coexistence equilibrium with >* 0gN  and >* 0nN , 
the innovation must increase the price of the non-GM product (relative to the pre-
innovation equilibrium). This implication, and other results of this section, is best illustrated 
with the aid of Figure 3, which depicts both the pre-innovation equilibrium and the post-
innovation coexistence equilibrium.  Note that the assumption that land is fully used means 
that, using (5) with 0gX =  and nX Ny= , the pre-innovation price of the non-GM product 
is 0 0( )np q a θ= + . In a coexistence equilibrium with >
* 0gN  and >* 0nN , from (15) the 
equilibrium price of the non-GM product is * 0 (1 )np q cθ γ β= + − . As long as >
* 0gN , then 
from (17) we find that 0(1 )c aγ β θ− > , which implies 
* 0
n np p> . Clearly, all consumers who still  
 
Figure 3. Coexistence equilibrium 
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buy the non-GM product after the adoption of the GM product must be strictly worse off.  
What about the consumers who elect to buy the GM product in the post-innovation 
situation? Recall that the consumers who buy the GM product have type 0 ˆ,θ θ θ ∈   , where 
ˆ ( )n gp p aθ ≡ −  and 0 gp qθ ≡ . Now consider the change in utility for a consumer of type 
θ  who buys the GM product in the post-innovation situation. Her change in utility, relative 
to pre-innovation, is * 0( ) ( )g gU a p a q pθ θ θ ∆ ≡ − − + −  , and thus 0( ) ( ) 0U aθ θ θ∆ = − − <  for 
all 0θ θ> .  Hence, even consumers who elect to buy the GM product in the post innovation 
situation are strictly worse off as a result of the introduction of the GM product, except for 
the marginal consumer. This is summarized as follows. 
 
Result 1. With full utilization of land in both the pre- and post-innovation equilibria, and 
given the assumed VPD preferences, adoption of the cost-reducing innovations makes all 
consumers strictly worse off (except for the marginal consumer who earns zero surplus in 
both situations). 
 
The reason for this result is that, because total land is given and the GM technology is 
modeled as cost-reducing (no yield effect), there is no change in aggregate production. 
Adoption of the cost-reducing innovation increases the returns to land, and the need for the 
non-GM product to compete for land with the newly introduced GM crop increases the full 
cost of production of the non-GM product. But of course, as detailed below, the innovation 
may still be valuable from a social point of view because of its efficiency (cost reducing) 
effect. 
 
4.2. Pareto optimality 
To derive the welfare maximizing allocation of land, we first note that, for any given 
allocation, full agglomeration is optimal because it minimizes the cost of separating GM and 
non-GM production. Conditional on full agglomeration, and given the demand and 
production structures assumed in the foregoing, the welfare function (total Marshallian 
surplus) associated with a given number 0,gN N∈    of GM farms can be written as 
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(19) 0 0( )(1 ) 2 22 2
g g
g
N y N yNyW q a Nyc a cN y y c
M
θ θ γ β γ
 
= + + − − + + − 
 
 
 
where the first two terms on the RHS represent welfare prior to the innovation (total surplus 
when consumers only have the non-GM product, net of production costs), the third term is 
the loss in surplus from consuming the quantity gN y  of GM product, the fourth term 
represent the total cost saving from GM production, and the last term represent the cost of 
buffer zones.  
Solving the first order condition for an interior solution yields the welfare 
maximizing solution for the number of GM farms: 
(20) ** 0
0(1 )
g
N cN
a
γ
θ
θ
 
= − −  
 
where we have used (11). Note that the cost of buffer zones is treated as a fixed cost in the 
welfare maximization problem and thus does not affect the optimal solution. For the 
solution in (20) to satisfy ** 0,gN N∈    it is necessary that 0 ,1c aγ θ∈    . The lower bound 
indicates that cultivation of the GM product in a strictly positive amount is desirable only if 
0c aγ θ> , that is the per-unit cost saving is larger than the loss in marginal consumer surplus 
for the consumer with the lowest valuation of the good (at the pre-innovation equilibrium).5 
 The optimal number of non-GM farms can be obtained from the constraint 
** **
n gN N N≡ − . Recalling the structure of inverse demand functions, it follows that the 
welfare maximizing solutions **nN  and 
**
gN  are equivalent to prices 
**
np  and 
**
gp   which 
satisfy ** **n gp p cγ− = . That is, welfare maximization equates the marginal willingness to pay 
for the additional quality provided by the non-GM product, as given by the inverse demand 
functions, with the marginal cost of providing this quality upgrade, which is the foregone 
cost saving γ c .  
To sum up, the welfare maximizing solution involves: only GM farms if 1c aγ ≥ ; 
only non-GM farms if 0c aγ θ≤ ; and, coexistence with both GM and non-GM farms if 
                                                     
5 Strictly speaking, at the lower bound of the domain one should ensure that the welfare gain 
of coexistence at the optimal solution is sufficient to cover the fixed cost β γ2 y c  of 
coexistence. But clearly, for large enough N  this fixed cost of coexistence can be ignored. 
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( )0 ,1c aγ θ∈ .  
 
4.3. Inefficiency of the competitive coexistence equilibrium 
The foregoing results highlight the fact that, when the cost of the buffer zone requirements 
are imposed on the GM farmers only, the competitive equilibrium is biased against the GM 
product. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where the parametric domains of various equilibria 
are defined relative to the ratio c aγ . 
 
Figure 4. Welfare maximization and competitive equilibrium 
 
 
 
Welfare maximization requires that coexistence with some GM production takes place 
whenever 0c aγ θ> , but the competitive equilibrium can deliver some GM output only if 
0 (1 )c aγ θ β> − , a higher threshold that is sensitive to the size of the mandated buffer zone 
parameter β . Indeed, as the analysis of the specialized equilibria illustrated, it is possible for 
an equilibrium with only non-GM farms to persist as long as 0 (1 2 )c aγ θ β≤ − , a higher 
threshold still. Similarly, the Pareto efficient solution calls for full conversion to GM 
production whenever 1c aγ ≥ , but the competitive equilibrium can only achieve full GM 
specialization when 1 (1 )c aγ β> − .  
To illustrate this point further, one can compare the welfare maximizing solution 
**
gN  to the competitive market equilibrium 
*
gN  solution from equation (17).
6 
                                                     
6 Recall that the number of farms of this equation follow from the necessary conditions for 
coexistence, which, as the discussion of specialized equilibria indicates, may not be sufficient 
for coexistence to actually emerge.  
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Result 2. In the domain where welfare maximization requires coexistence (both products 
are produced), a policy that puts the burden only on GM producers leads to a competitive 
equilibrium which entails too little GM product (i.e., * **g gN N< ).  
 
This results follows immediately because, by using equations (17) and (20), the competitive 
equilibrium solution for the number of GM farms, in the relevant domain, can be written as  
* **
0(1 )
g g
cNN N
a
βγ
θ
= −
−
 
The bias of the coexistence equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5, where the solid line 
illustrates the Pareto efficient number of GM farms **gN , and the dashed line denotes the 
competitive equilibrium number of GM farms *gN , both expressed as a function of the 
relative efficiency ratio c aγ . 
 
Figure 5. Pareto optimality and the competitive equilibrium  
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To understand why coexistence policies that put the burden of segregation entirely 
on GM producers lead to a competitive equilibrium that does not achieve efficiency, it is 
important to appreciate the nature of the market failure at work. The premise of coexistence 
measures is predicated on the principle that GM producers exert an externality (e.g., pollen 
flow) on non-GM producers. Mandating buffer zones and/or isolation distances on GM 
producers forces GM farms that are adjacent to non-GM farms to internalize this external 
effect. In equilibrium, this leads to some agglomeration of like farms (recall Lemma 1), 
although the pattern of agglomeration that can arise in a competitive equilibrium is not 
unique. In such equilibria, however, GM producers who are at the boundary of the GM 
producing region exert a positive externality on GM producers who are located in the 
interior of this region (which permits them to avoid having to implement costly coexistence 
measures and thereby earn a profit π π π> =0 1 0
g g n ). These positive impacts are present in the 
welfare function, and are captured by the welfare maximization requirement of full 
agglomeration of like farms. But these positive impacts are not recognized by the 
coexistence measures that we have modeled, and are not captured by the competitive 
equilibrium. This conclusion reflects a more fundamental property of the problem: whereas 
the cultivation of GM crops introduces an externality at the farm level, at the aggregate level 
it gives rise to a nonconvexity. As emphasized by Lapan and Moschini (2004), in a fully 
agglomerated equilibrium the external effects are not related to the quantity of a GM 
product that is produced, but to the fact the GM product is produced at all. 7 This is 
apparent in the formulation of the welfare function in (19) where the cost of coexistence 
essentially enters as a fixed cost. 
 
4.4. Sharing coexistence measures 
For a better appreciation of Result 2 it is important to note the inherent symmetry of the 
structure of the model and the asymmetry in the coexistence policy considered. If the 
burden of coexistence were reversed, such that the costs of buffer zones were to be borne 
entirely by non-GM producers, the opposite conclusion would attain: competitive 
                                                     
7 This feature is also present in Munro (2008), who considers a stylized model of GM and 
non-GM production. He does not relate the model to specific coexistence policies, assumes 
that the burden of isolation is entirely on non-GM producers, and discusses mainly the 
special case in which non-GM production may fail to emerge in equilibrium.  
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equilibrium would yield too little non-GM production, relative to the welfare optimum.8 This 
observation motivates consideration of a policy that shares the cost of buffer zones between 
adjacent GM and non-GM farms. Specifically, suppose that non-GM farms bordering a GM 
farm are required to bear a share (0,1)σ ∈  of the buffer zone cost, while the bordering GM 
farms bears the remaining share (1 )σ−  of such cost. For either farm, the buffer zone is 
costly because it entails having to plant it as non-GM product (and thus without any cost 
savings) but having to sell the resulting output as GM product. Thus, for given output prices 
np  and gp , the profits of the possible types of farms are as follows: 
(21) ( )1 1n n gp y p y cyπ σβ σβ= − + −  
(22) ( )1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )g gp y cy cyπ σ β γ σ β= − − − − − −  
(23) 2 (1 2 ) 2
n
n gp y p y cyπ σβ σβ= − + −  
(24) ( )2 1 (1 )2 (1 ) (1 )2g gp y cy cyπ σ β γ σ β= − − − − − −  
where, as before, the superscript indicates the type of product (non-GM or GM) and the 
subscript refers to the number neighboring farms that produce the other products. The 
profit expressions for farms that do not implement any buffer strips (i.e., 0
nπ  and 0
gπ ) are of 
course the same as given in (7) and (8). 
As for the case where the burden of coexistence is fully on GM producers, 
considered earlier, we can rule out spatial configurations that require farms to implement 
buffer zones on both sides (i.e., isolated farms). 
 
Lemma 2. In a coexistence spatial equilibrium where coexistence measures are shared, there 
can be no isolated farms of any type (GM or non-GM). 
 
The reason for this property is that an isolated farm, of either type, could change the crop it 
grows and strictly increase its profit. Hence, the relevant equilibria configurations are given 
by Case 1 and Case 2, for which there are no isolated farms (either GM or non-GM). In such 
                                                     
8 In fact, if the burden of coexistence were entirely on non-GM producers, it would be 
possible for the GM crop to be adopted in equilibrium even when the efficiency parameter is 
low enough that zero adoption is optimal from a welfare perspective, similar to the result of 
Moschini, Bulut and Cembalo (2005). 
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equilibria, therefore, farms will border at most one farm growing the other product. 
Equilibrium requires prices to be such that π π=1 1
gn  which, based on the foregoing, implies 
(25) ( ) ( ) ( )σβ σ β γ− − = − −* * 1 1 (1 )n gp p c  
Recall that, for welfare maximization, the conditions for a coexistence equilibrium is that the 
marginal willingness to pay for the additional quality of the non-GM good be equal to the 
marginal cost of providing this quality upgrade (which is the foregone cost saving), that is 
** **
n gp p cγ− = . From (25) it is then immediately apparent that setting 1 2σ =  induces the 
competitive equilibrium with coexistence to achieve exactly the price conditions for welfare 
maximization.9  
 
Result 3. Sharing the cost of the buffer zone requirement equally between neighboring GM 
and non-GM farms leads to a coexistence equilibrium with precisely the same number of 
GM and non-GM farms as entailed by the Pareto optimality conditions. 
 
Note that in deriving Result 3 we have appealed to the Pareto efficient condition 
** **
n gp p cγ− =  which, strictly speaking, was derived for the case where the buffer zone 
requirements are implemented on GM farms only. Sharing the buffer zone measures 
between GM and non-GM farms, rather than implementing such zones on GM farms only, 
is essentially equivalent from a welfare perspective because, in either case, the use of buffer 
zones requires non-GM crop to be grown and sold as GM product.  A minor consideration 
is that, for any given number nN  and gN  of non-GM and GM farms, respectively, sharing 
the buffer measures means that a little less non-GM output (and a little more GM output) is 
available in the aggregate, compared with the case where the burden is entirely on GM 
farms. But it is of course still the case that full agglomeration of GM and non-GM 
production is desirable from a welfare perspective, so that only two buffer zones are 
required. Hence, when the total number of farms N  is large, such differences in total 
aggregate output levels are inconsequential.  
 
                                                     
9 Of course, the competitive equilibrium cannot guarantee the full spatial agglomeration that 
characterizes the first best solution. 
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4.5. Specialized equilibria 
To investigate the possibility of specialized equilibria when coexistence measures are shared, 
from the foregoing analysis we focus on the case 1 2σ = . Consider first the possibility that 
only the GM product is produced, that is gX Ny=  and 0nX = . For this to be an 
equilibrium it must be that, at the corresponding prices, π π≤2 0
gn , which requires 
* *( )(1 )n gp p cβ γ− − ≤ . At this postulated equilibrium, the prices of the two products satisfy 
* *
n gp p a= + , and so the parametric space that can support a specialized equilibrium with only 
GM production is (1 )c aγ β≥ − . Next, suppose that only non-GM product is produced, 
that is 0gX =  and  nX Ny= . For this to be an equilibrium it must be that, at the 
corresponding prices, π π≤2 0
g n , which requires * *(1 ) ( )n gc p pγ β− ≤ − . At this postulated 
equilibrium, equilibrium prices of the two products satisfy * * 0n gp p aθ= + . Hence, the 
condition for only non-GM product to be supported in equilibrium is 0 (1 )c aγ θ β≤ − . 
 Similar to the case where buffer zones are mandated on GM farms only, therefore, in 
some domain of the parameter space we find that both coexistence and specialized equilibria 
may exist. Specifically, non-GM-only or coexistence may both be equilibria when 
0 0 (1 )c aθ γ θ β≤ ≤ − , and GM-only or coexistence may both be equilibria when  
(1 ) 1c aβ γ− ≤ ≤ . Figure 6 illustrates. 
 
Figure 6. Welfare maximization and competitive equilibrium with 1 2σ =  
 
 
 
θ0
coexistence 
only non-GM only GM 
0
c
a
γ
β−1 1
only non-GM coexistence only GM 
Competitive 
Equilibrium: 
Welfare 
Maximization:
θ
β−
0
1
 23 
5. Agreements between farmers and agglomeration 
The inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium with coexistence could in principle be 
remedied, following Coase (1960), by negotiated agreements between farmers. If bargaining 
were costless, farmers could negotiate themselves to the efficient allocation regardless of 
who bears the burden of coexistence costs (Beckmann and Wesseler, 2007). For example, 
farmers in the competitive equilibrium of the right panel of Figure 2 could negotiate 
production changes leading to the competitive equilibrium in the left panel of Figure 2. Both 
configurations entail the same aggregate supply of GM and non-GM products, and therefore 
the same equilibrium prices. However, the spatial configuration on the left panel of Figure 2 
is more efficient because it entails lower total costs (fewer buffer zones). The presumption of 
costless bargaining, however, is difficult to maintain. Transaction costs are ubiquitous and 
significant in real economic environments, and arguably Coase’s analysis is best viewed as an 
invitation to explicitly account for these transaction costs (Tadelis and Williamson, 2013). 
Such costs are bound to be nontrivial for the case at hand because, as the characterization of 
the problem in this paper suggests, multilateral bargaining between large numbers of farmers 
in the agglomerated equilibrium may be required to achieve the first-best allocation.10 For 
example, moving from the configuration of the right panel of Figure 2 to that of the left 
panel of Figure 2 requires four of the eight farms (specifically, farms 5, 6, 7 and 8) to change 
type of production. Furthermore, such a change would strictly benefit only one of the four 
farms making the switch (farm 8, whose payoff increases from 0
nπ  to 0
gπ ), indicating the 
need for side payments to bring about the change.11  
 What about the prospect of limited bargaining possibilities between farmers? 
Suppose, for instance, that costless agreements between any two neighboring farmers are 
possible (but agreements between three or more farmers are prohibitively costly). It turns 
out that this would have drastic implications for the competitive equilibrium. 
                                                     
10 Ambec, Langinier and Marcoul (2012) consider coordination between producers in a more 
elaborate spatial setting (but, similar to most other coexistence studies, they eschew a full 
equilibrium analysis by assuming exogenously given prices for the two products). 
 
11 Such a change would also strictly benefit one of the farms that remains a GM producer 
(farm 1), whose payoff increases from 1
gπ  to 0
gπ . This spillover effect suggests that, to 
facilitate the internalization of the agglomeration benefits from any given suboptimal 
allocation, side payments may need to involve a larger set of farms than those changing 
production plans. 
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Remark 1. If costless agreements between any two neighboring farmers are possible, only 
specialized equilibria can arise in a competitive equilibrium (or an equilibrium may fail to 
exist). 
 
To see this, consider the coexistence equilibrium characterized in Section 3.1 where, at the 
equilibrium prices * *( , )n gp p , spatial equilibrium requires the condition 0 1 0
g gnπ π π= <  to hold. 
By construction, no farm has a unilateral incentive to change production plan. But if the two 
neighboring farms at the boundary of GM and non-GM regions could make an enforceable 
agreement, the non-GM farm could become a GM farm thereby raising their joint profit to 
1 0 0 1
g g gnπ π π π+ > + . This profitable opportunity is present for any pair of prices * *( , )n gp p  for 
which 0 1
gnπ π=  holds, which means that such a coexistence equilibrium cannot exist. With 
respect to the possible cases illustrated in Section 3, this argument implies that the 
specialized non-GM-only equilibrium can attain if the parameters are such that 
0 (1 2 )c aγ θ β≤ − , and the specialized GM-only equilibrium can attain if the parameters are 
such that 1c aγ ≥ . For the parametric domain ( )0 (1 2 ) , 1c aγ θ β∈ − , on the other hand, 
no competitive equilibrium can exist if costless agreements between any two neighboring 
farmers were possible.  
 Whereas the foregoing discussion provides a better appreciation for the nature of the 
model developed in this paper, it does not detract from the main conclusions that we have 
drawn from the analysis. The fact remains that the presumption of costless bargaining is 
difficult to maintain. Assigning the burden of coexistence only to GM farmers penalizes the 
adoption of the new technology in a clear way. If consumer preferences are such that 
preserving cultivation of the non-GM crop is valuable to society, the foregoing analysis 
shows that a more balanced approach that shares the burden of coexistence between GM 
and non-GM farmers might lead to an improved allocation of production. 
  
6. Conclusion 
The cultivation of GM crops makes it more costly to produce non-GM output because care 
must be taken to avoid unintended contamination of the latter. Whereas concerns about 
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coexistence have emerged elsewhere as well, they have taken central stage in the EU. Policies 
being considered and implemented emphasize the prevention of contamination at the farm 
level by such measures as isolation distances and buffer zones. This is justified by the 
observation that contamination is the result of an externality (e.g., pollen flow) that GM 
producers exert on non-GM producers. Implementing coexistence measures is costly, and 
policies being considered by EU member states appear to put this burden exclusively on GM 
producers.  
By using an explicit spatial equilibrium model, in this paper we have characterized 
some key consequences of such policies. By being forced to implement isolation measures 
such as buffer zones, a GM producer whose farm is adjacent to that of a non-GM producer 
internalizes the externality that they exert on this non-GM producer. Equilibria with 
coexistence of both GM and non-GM products, however, inevitably display a degree of 
agglomeration (no isolated GM farm can exist in a competitive equilibrium). GM producers 
who are at the boundary of the GM and non-GM set of farms therefore exert a positive 
externality on GM producers in the interior who enjoy a higher profit because they do not 
need to implement buffer zones.  Coexistence policies predicated on the polluter-pays 
principle, however, do not provide a mechanism for this positive externality to be 
compensated. The crux of the matter is that, from the point of view of welfare 
maximization, the problem being addressed is not a standard externality, it is a nonconvexity: 
given that some GM product is desirable from the perspective of total Marshallian surplus, 
in the aggregate, buffer zones are a fixed cost to be paid for the need to isolate the 
production of the two products. As shown in this paper, competitive equilibria that arise 
when the burden of coexistence is entirely on GM producers are biased against the adoption 
of GM crops.  
Some caveats naturally apply to the analysis of this paper. Whereas the hypothesis of 
VPD is attractive in our setting, and indeed it has been assumed (formally or informally) by a 
great many studies of the economic consequences of GM products, the parameterization 
utilized (favored in the literature for its analytical simplicity) is somewhat special. Similarly, 
we have modeled the efficiency-enhancing attribute of GM crops in terms of cost reduction 
rather than as yield increasing. Again, we have chosen our modeling strategy for its analytical 
clarity, but production theory can establish a duality between these two effects, suggesting 
that the results we obtain have some general validity. Limiting the model to only two 
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products inevitably simplifies real-world agricultural landscapes, but it permits the analysis to 
focus crisply on some essential features of coexistence policies. The payoff from the chosen 
modeling strategy is that it permits an explicit equilibrium analysis of coexistence measures, 
and such an equilibrium framework is an essential ingredient for welfare analysis.      
In the simple competitive spatial equilibrium model of this paper, we have also 
shown that the Pareto efficient allocation of land to GM and non-GM products could be 
supported by coexistence rules that share the cost of implementing isolating buffer zones 
between (adjacent) GM and non-GM farms. This result has immediate policy implications 
for the design of effective implementation of rules furthering the EU objective of ensuring 
coexistence between GM and non-GM products. The emerging EU coexistence policies are 
highly controversial (Ramessar et al., 2010). Similar to other post-market regulations, the fear 
is that they may be used instrumentally to keep GM products out of the market despite their 
having been cleared in the pre-market approval process. Taking the coexistence objectives at 
face value, we have shown coexistence policies can be tailored to achieve efficient outcomes. 
For the specific model analyzed in this paper, this solution takes a particular simple form: the 
cost of coexistence measures should be shared equally between contiguous GM and non-
GM farms, evocative of Horace’s dictum that “in medio stat virtus.” Whereas the fifty-fifty 
sharing rule, to a certain extent, reflects the particular parameterization of the model, we 
believe that, more generally, our result suggests that a balanced approach to coexistence 
policies—one that does not unilaterally privilege pre-existing crop patterns but is instead 
open to efficiency-enhancing innovations—might be highly desirable. 
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